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SEIGNORAGE AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY
ABSTRACT
The importance of seignorage relative to other sources of government
revenue differs markedly across countries. The main theoretical implication
of this paper is that countries with more unstable and polarized political
systems rely more heavily on seignorage. This result is obtained within the
context of a political model of tax reform. The model implies that the more
unstable and polarized the political system, the more inefficient is the
equilibrium tax structure (in the sense that tax collection is more costly
to administer), and the higher therefore, the reliance on seignorage. This
prediction of the model is tested on cross-section data for 79 countries.
It is found that, after controlling for other variables, political instabil-
ity significantly contributes to explain the fraction of government revenue
derived from seignorage. This finding is very robust. We also find that
seignorage is positively related to political polarization, even though here
the evidence is weaker because of difficulties in measuring polarization.
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Over the years economists and other social scientists have recurrently
wondered why inflation rates and seignorage have, over long periods of time,
differed so markedly across countries. How can we explain, for example.
that during the period 1971-82 inflation in Chile was on average l7% per
annum, in Indonesia 17%, in Burnundi 10% and in Germany only 5%? Some of
the more popular explanations have relied on the obvious, arguing that more
inflationary countries have exhibited more lax fiscal and monetary policies
I
than the more stable nations. But this begs the obvious questLon of
somecountries are able to maintain fiscal and monetary discipline while
others are unable (or unwilling) to do it. A different approach has focused
on the characteristics of the tax system, arguing that for institutional or
technological reasons the less developed countries are unable to build
sophisticated tax systems, and thus have to rely heavily on inflation to
finance government expenditure. This line of thought however fails to
explain the significant inflation differentials in many countries with
roughly the same level of development or the same economic structure. For
instance, contrary to popular mythology, not all Latin American countries
are highly inflationary.2
In this paper we accept the traditional explanation that seignorage
reflects high costs of administering and enforcing the collection of regular
taxes. But we argue that the evolution of the tax system of a country also
depends on the features of its political system, and not just on those of
its economic structure.
The central idea of the paper can be stated as follows. An inefficient
tax system (i.e., one that facilitates tax evasion and imposes high tax
collection costs) acts as a constraint on the revenue collecting policies of2
the government. This constraint may be welcome by those who disagree with
the goals pursued by the current government. In particular, previous
governments or legislative majorities) may deliberately choose to maintain
(or create) an inefficient tax system, so as to constrain the behavior of
future governments (or majorities) with which they might disagree. Of
course, this is more likely to happen in countries with more unstable and
polarized political systems. This argument is formalized and made more
precise in Section 2 of the paper.
This idea leads to an obvious empirical implication. Namely that,
after controlling for the stage of development and the structure of the
economy, more unstable and polarized countries collect a larger fraction of
their revenues through seignorage compared to more stable and homogeneous
societies. This conjecture is tested in Section 3 of the paper.In the
remainder of this section we present some empirical evidence that motivates
our investigation.
1.1 Cross Country Differentials in Inflation and Seiznoyaze; The Emoirical.
Evidence
Table 1 shows average inflation and seignorage over 1971-82 for 79
countries for which data are available.3 Inflation is defined as the rate
of change of the consumer price index, while seignorage is defined as the
ratio of the increase in base money to total government revenues.4 This
table points to a very wide range of inflationary experiences. While some
countries, even some very poor ones, have been very stable, others have had
extremely high rates of inflation. Also, the table shows that the extent to
which countries use money creation to finance their expenditures variesvery
widely, with some countries relying on seignorage to cover over 28 percent
of their revenues.53
How much of this cross-country variability can be explained by economic
variables alone? To answer this question, we estimate some cross country
linear equations that relate seignorage to a set of structural variables
suggested in the literature.6 All variables are averaged over the period
1971-82, except if otherwise noted. Seignorage is the dependent variables.
The independent variables fall into three categories:(1) The sectoral
composition of gross domestic product, to account for differences in admin-
istering tax collection across sectors. We expect the agricultural sector
to be the hardest to tax, and thus to have a positive coefficient in the
regressions. The mining and manufacturing sector are assumed to be the
easiest to tax, and thus to have a negative coefficient. We also include
the ratio of foreign trade to CNP, since in many developing countries
imports and exports are a cheap tax base; hence its coefficient too is
expected to be negative.(2) Two measures of economic development: GDP
per capita, and a dummy variable taking a value of I for the industrialized
countries and 0 otherwise. We expect both variables to have a negative
coefficient, since the technology for enforcing tax collection is likely to
be more inefficient in less developed countries. (3) A measure of urbaniz-
ation, since tax collection costs are likely to be smaller in urban areas
than in rural areas; this leads us to expect a negative coefficient.7 These
variables are defined more precisely in the Data Appendix.
The results are reported in Table 2, for alternative specifications of
the regressions. The first three columns refer to all the countries in the
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sample. The last two columns refer to developing countries only.Most of
the coefficients have the expected sign. One exception is the share of
manufacturing and mining which is positive in equation (5). Its coefficient
is, however, insignificant. A second exception refers to the coefficient ofurbanization, which is always positive and highly significant. We interpret
this as preliminary evidence in favor of a political explanation of seignor-
age differentials. As noted by political scientists, political awareness
and political conflicts are likely to be more prominent in urban areas than
in rural societies. We return to this point below, in Section 3.
In column (3) of the table we added two dummies that group countries
into continents. The Latin America dummy is positive and significant at the
5 percent level. This is further evidence that non-economic variables play
a role in explaining cross country inflation differentials.
These regressions account for 33% to 42% of the variance in the data,
irrespective of whether or not the industrialized countries are included.
(These figures refer to the regressions R2, rather than the depicted
in the table.) This result is not discouraging, given how different these
countries are. However, it Leaves a large margin for improvement. This is
what we attempt to do in the remainder of the paper. In the next section we
analyze a simple model of tax reforms that has implications for cross
country differences in seignorage. We then show that this theoretical
explanation is consistent with the data.
2. A Political Model of Tax Reforms
The central feature of the model of this section is a distinction
between fiscal policy and tax reforms. A fiscal policy is the choice of tax
rates, and of the level and composition of government spending. A tax reform
is the broad design of a tax system that determines the available tax bases
and the technology for collecting taxes. Even though in practice it may be
difficult to decide where to draw the line, at a conceptual level this
distinction has important implications. A tax reform that changes the tax5
system will, typically take time and resources, since it requires investment
in the acquisition of information and in infrastructure. A fiscal policy, on
the other hand, can be implemented more swiftly. Thus, at any given moment
in time, the existing tax system acts as a constraint on the fiscal policy of
the current government. This suggests that tax reforms are also determined
by strategic considerations: a tax system is designed by taking into account
how it will constrain the fiscal policies of future governments. The central
idea of this section is that, if there is political instability and political
polarization, these strategic considerations may induce the current govern-
ment to leave an inefficient tax system to its successors.9
2.1 The Model
To focus the analysis on the political determinants of the tax system,
the economy is described only by two simple equations: the budget
constraint of the government (eq. (1)) and of the private sector (eq. (2)).
+ 'tt-l + St
(1)
c 1 - - - -y(s (2)
Subscripts denote time periods. Each individual is endowed with one unit of
output in each period. g and are two different public goods in per
capita terms and c is private consumption, also per capita. The govern-
ment collects from each individual an amount s in the form of "seignor-
age", and an amount of tax revenue. The main difference between taxes
and seignorage is that a fraction of the tax revenue is wasted due to
tax collection Costs, whereas seignorage Carries flO administrative costs.
Both taxes and seignorage impose deadweight losses on the private sector,
equal to 6(r) and 1(s) respectively. These distortions increase at an
increasing rate. Thus:6
8'(.) >0, 8"(.)>0
'(.)>0, -'(.) > 0
The assumptions about 9, 8(•)andy(.) can be altered without affecting
the main qualitative result.
Here, 0t1 is a rough measure of the efficiency of th tax system. A
lower value of 9 implies a more efficient tax system. Thus, in this
simple model, a tax reform amounts to a choice of 9, whereas a fiscal
policy is a choice of g, f, r and s. To capture the greater inertia in
reforming the tax system than in changing fiscal policy, we assume that 9,
but not the other policy variables, must be chosen one period in advance.
Thus, 9 is chosen at timet but exerts an influence on tax collection
costs only at time t+l (cf., eq. (1)). In a previous version of the
paper, we generalized all the results to alternative ways of modelling the
inertia of the tax system (such as with lump sum costs) .Inthe empirical
analysis of the next section we also allow 9 to be partially determined by
technological features of the economy, like those proxied by the variables
of Table 2.10
There are two possible policymaker types, L and R, who randomly
alternate in office. The policymaker of type i,i —L,Rmaximizes:
—E(Ek[U(c) + I > fi>0 (3)
where E(.) denotes the expectation operator, U(•) is a concave and twice
continuously differentiable utility functions, and Hi(.')is defined as
follows. If i —
HL(g,f)— Min[ag,(l.a)f], 1 > a > 0 (3')
and if i —R,then HR(.)is defined as in (3'), but with a replaced by7
(1-a).Thus, these two policymakers differ only in the desired composition
of the public good. For simplicity, their disagreement is parameterized by
a. The more distant is a from 1/2, the more they disagree. By const-
ruction, the overall weight given to private versus public consumption does
not depend on a.
The political system is described as a Markov process with transition
probabilities
irand (1-ic):the government who is in office at time t
hasa fixed probability (1-ic) of being reappointed next period. iJith
probability ic,it is thrown Out of office and the other policymaker type
is appointed. These simplifying assumptions can be extended in several
ways. All the results go through if the political process is modelled as in
Alesina and Tabellini (1987), where rational voters elect the policymaker
type at the beginning of each period. A previous version showed that, under
appropriate conditions, the results generalize to a concave H(s) function
in (3). Similarly, the symmetry of the model and the fact that both
government types assign the same weight to private versus public consumption
simplify the exposition but do not effect the nature of the results.
In our model, then, the political system has two important features:
its instability, represented by the probability of losing office, ic.And
the degree of polarization between the alternating governments, represented
by the disagreement parameter a. As we shall see below, these two features
determine the equilibrium efficiency of the tax system.
2.2 Economic Policy Within a Given Tax System
This subsection characterizes the equilibrium choice of st.
and
for a given value of Thechoice of is studied in the next
subsection. Since 9isthe only state variable, the equilibrium values of
r,s,g and I as a function of 8arefound by solving the static8
problem of maximizing [U(c)+H1(gf)]subject to (1) and (2). Time
subscripts are omitted when superfluous. We only describe the equilibrium
when type L is in office; for concreteness, we assume m >1/2.By symmet-
ry, the opposite case of R in office is obtained by replacing g with f.
Let x —g+fdenote the total amount of government spending. After
some transformations, the first order conditions of this problem give11




Equation (4a) describe the optimal allocation of public consumption. The L
superscripts remind us that type L is in office. Equation (4b) compares
the marginal utility of public and private consumption. With distortionary
taxes, at an optimum the marginal utility of public consumption (unity)
exceeds the marginal utility of private consumption. Equation (4c) is the
Ramsey rule: it equates at the margin the distortions associated with the
last dollar collected from each source of revenue. These three conditions
underscore that the identity of the government only matters for the
composition of public consumption. Both government types choose the same
level of overall public spending and the same tax policy, irrespective of
the value of a.
Together with (l)-(2), equations (4) implicitly define the equilibrium
values of all variables as functions of the efficiency of the tax system,9:
c* —C(9),x* —X(9),s* —S(8),i*— T(S) (5)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (1), (2) and (4) yields (the proof
is available upon request):9
ProDosition 1
X'(9) < 0 S'(9) > 0 C'(O) > 0 T'(9) < 0
Thus, as intuitive, a more inefficient tax system discourages public
spending and forces the government to rely more on seignorage and less on
regular taxes as a source of revenue. Also, a more inefficient tax system
12
raises private consumption.
2.3 Choosing the Efficiency of the Tax System
We now turn to the question of how the efficiency ofthetax system is
determined in equilibrium. Since, by assumption, 9 has to be set one
period in advance and there is no cost in changing it, to characterize the
infinite horizon equilibrium it suffices to look one period ahead. With
probability (1-it),tomorrowtype L isreappointed in office. In this
case, by (4a) and (3), his utility is:
U(c(9)) + X(8) (6a)
With probabilityit,tomorrow typeR is appointed. By symmetry, gR —fL




Thus is chosen so as to maximize the following expected utility
function (because of the symmetry of the model, this is also the utility
function of type R, when in office):
(l.ir)[U(C(9))+X(8)]+1r[U(C(6))1 x(9)1_u(C(e))+s(ir,)x(et)(7)
where(1c,a) —(I-it)+ir(l-a)/a1.
Theequilibrium value of 9 satisfies the first order condition:31.0
U'(C(9flC' (8) +,8(ra)X'(8) 0 (8)
with (8) holding as an equality if 8 >0.Time subscripts are omitted from
now on, since all, periods are alike. The first term on the left hand side
of (8) is the marginal gain of raising the inefficiency of the tax system;
since C'(9) >0,this gain takes the form of higher private consumption.
The second term is the expected marginal cost of a more inefficient tax
system, that takes the form of reduced public consumption (recall that
X'(9) <0)).
According to (8) ,themagnitude of this expected marginal cost depends





where a subscript denotes a partial derivative. Thus, the expected marginal
cost of having an inefficient tax system is lower: (i) the more unstable
and (ii) the more polarized is the political system. In the limit, this
marginal cost tends to zero as the political system becomes extremely
unstable and polarized.
By (8) and (9), the equilibrium efficiency of the tax system, 9*,is
a function of the stability and polarization of the tax system:
9* —8(ir,a).We have:
ProDositign 2:(i) 9(0.a) —9(,r.)—0
(ii) There exists a pair < I and a.. <1such that 8(i',a) >0for
any ,r>,r0, a>a0.
(iii) If 9* >0,then e>0 and 9 >0.
The first statement follows by combing (4) and (8), and noting that fl(0,a)
—(r,½)—1.The rest of the proof is obtained applying the implicit11
function theorem to (8), and invoking (9) and the second order conditions.
This Proposition summarizes the central theoretical result of the
paper. If the current government is certain of being reappointed, or if
there is no polarization, then it always brings about the most efficient tax
system. However, with a sufficient degree of political instability
polarization, a more inefficient system may be preferred. More generally.
the lower is the probability that the current government will remain in
office and the greater is polarization, the more inefficient is the tax
system left as a legacy to its successors. This happens for a purely
strategic reason, and even though it is costless to improve the efficiency
of the tax system: A more inefficient tax collection apparatus discourages
future governments from collecting taxes and spending them on goods that are
not valued by the incumbent policymaker. The equilibrium value of 9is
chosen so as to equate the expected marginal benefit of constraining future
governments to the marginal cost caused by inefficient taxation. Jhen
decreases or approaches the marginal cost of an inefficient tax
system rises, since the current government is more likely to be reappointed,
or if not reappointed it does not care much since it is more similar to its
opponent. As a result, 9* decreases.
Finally, the equilibrium inefficiency of the tax system that emerges
when 9* >0can, in some sense, be socially efficient. By construction,
maximizes the expected utility of the government in office at time t.
If — also maximizes the expected utility of the policymaker who
is out of office in period t.Inthis case, 9* >0is socially efficient
(in an ex ante sense), Even if 01/2,the ex ante efficient value of
can be positive -- eventhough it does not coincide with the equilibrium of
the model. The reason is that a positive value of 6, by constraining the1.2
taxcollection capacity of future governments, reduces the variance in the
composition of public spending and increases private consumption. The
optimality for society as a whole of having high tax collection costsmay
seem surprising. But it is really in the nature of a third best result.
Political instability and polarization create a distortion, in the form ofa
high variance in the composition of public spending. High tax collection
14 costsoffset this distortion, and hence are socially efficient.
Combining Propositions 1and2 yields the following central empirical
implication: Countries withmoreunstable and oolarjzed political systems
rely more heavily on sei2norae as a source of revenue than more stableand
homozeneous societies. The remainder of this paper tests thispositive
implication.
3. The Evidence
In this section we extent the cross-sectional investigation ofTable 2.
Section 1. by adding explanatory variables that refer to thepolitical
system. Each observation corresponds to a time average for a specific
country. Our goal is to estimate an equation of the following general form:
sQ+flzj+7p+u (10)
where the subscript refers to country i;s denotes the level of seignorage
as a fraction of total government revenues (includingseignorage); z is a
vector of variables measuring the economic structure ofcountry i; p is
a vector of political variables designed to capture thedegree of instabil-
ity and of polarization of the political system; andu is an error term.
We are interested in the sign of the estimated coefficient
.i.
The economic variables are the same as in Table 2.They account for
economic and structural factors affecting the cost ofadministering and13
enforcing tax collection. The measurement of the political variables
presents several difficulties. Even though the notions of political instab-
ility and polarization are conceptually well defined, they do not have an
obvious measurable counterpart. We deal with this problem in the next sub-
section, where we estimate a probit model to obtain a measure of political
instability. We defer the discussion on polarization to subsection 3.3.
Subsection 3.2 provides a general description of the data. The estimation
of equation (10) is carried out in Subsection 3.3. Finally, Subsection 3L4
shows that the results are robust to alternative specifications of the
model, to alternative measurements of some of the variables, and to the
possible presence of errors in variables.
3.1 Measures of political Instability and Polarization
The theoretical model isolates a central feature of the political
system: the degree of political instability, defined as the probabilityof
a government change as perceived by the current government. This feature is
unobservable. As a proxy, we construct a measure of political instability
from the data of Taylor-Jodice (198.. -Thesedata contain yearly observa-
tions on regular and irregular (i ..coups)government transfers unsuccess-
ful coup attempts, executive adjustments, and other political events.
We proceed as follows. First, we estimate a yearly probit model on
time series data, or on pooled time series and cross country data, over the
period 1948-82. At this stage we do not discriminate between regular and
irregular government changes -- eventhough we do it below, in the cross
country regressions. The dependent variable takes a value of0 for the
years in which there is no government change (regular or irregular),and a
value of 1 otherwise, Changes in the composition of the executive are not
considered to be changes in government.15 The explanatory variables in the14
probit model fall, in three broad classes: economic variables, designed to
measure the recent economic performance of the government; political
variables, accounting for significant political events that may signal the
imminence of a crisis; and structural variables, accounting for institution-
al differences and country specific factors that do not change, or that
change only slowly over time. These structural variables consist of three
dummy variables that group countries in three categories, according to their
political institutions: (1.)democracies; (ii) democracies in which the
election date is determined by the constitution; and (iii) democracies
ruled by a single majoritarian parry. Even though these three groups are
too broad to account for the variety of existing political institutions at
least they discriminate between very different constitutional environments.
All these variables are defined in Table 3A below.
Table 3B reports the results of the probit regression when all
countries are pooled together in the same data set and a constant dummy for
each country is added. Most variables have the expected sign, even though
only a few are significant. In particular, government change is made more
likely by unusual inflation in the previous year, and by unusually low
growth of private consumption over the current and previous two years. (As
explained in Table 3A, these variables are measured in deviation from their
country means.) Moreover, riots, political repressions, adjustments in the
composition of the executive, and unsuccessful attempts to change the
governmentall signal the imminence of a political crisis. Two of the
institutional dummies are significant: democracies have more frequent
government changes than non-democratic regimes. And coalition governments
or minority governments are less stable than majoritarian governments.
Several of the country specific dummies (not reported in the table)are also15
significant.indicating that there are additional factors contributing to
instability of the political system which are not fully captured by our
explanatory variables. These estimates are very robust to changes in the
model specification. This same regression has been estimated on each
country separately (except that the structural variables have been dropped
and all lags of the same variables have been constrained to have the same
coefficient, in order to save degrees of freedom).
Using the pooled time series-cross country and the country specific
probit regressions, we compute two estimated frequencies of government
change in each country during the period 1971-82. They are obtained by
averaging the estimated probabilities of government change over that time
period. These two estimated frequencies of government change provide two
alternative measures of political instability. We label them P and PS
respectively.
As a third measure, we also compute the actual frecuencv (F) of
government change. As shown in Maddala (1983, pp. 25, 26), for any logit
regression that includes the intercept, actual and estimated frequencies in
the sample always coincide. Hence the actual frequency also provides a
measure of the expected frequency of government change. As shown in Table
4, these three measures of political instability are highly correlated with
each other. They are also correlated with other measures, estimated from
alternative specifications of the probit model.
There are two possible sources of error in these estimates. First, they
contain more information than was available to the governments at the time,
since they are estimated form data up to 1982. Second, they omit relevant
information that was available to the governments but is not reflected in our
explanatory variables. Presumably the most important omitted informationLb
concerns institutional detail not observable or not easy to quantify.
We deal with the first problem by also estimating the cross country
regressions. equation (10), by instrumental variable methods. As argued in
subsection 3., the chosen instrument is likely to be uncorrelated with this
source of error. We deal with the second problem in subsection 3.5. by
showing that the results are robust to errors in variables.
Besides political instability, the theoretical model of Section 2
emphasizes the importance of another political variable: the degree of
polarization between the current government and its likely future contenders.
Measuring this form of polarization is a significantly more difficult task.
In the next subsection we discuss the inclusion of variables that may proxy
for it.
The remainder of the paper investigates whether these measures of
political instability and polarization can explain the facts described in
the Introduction, as predicted by our theory.
3.2 Data Description
The sample of countries, determined by data availability, is the same
as in Tables 1 and 2. The data sources are described in the Data Appendix.
The variables are averaged over the time period 1971-82, except if otherwise
noted --seealso footnote 3.In Subsection 3.4 we report the results of
experimenting with other periodizacions.
The means, variances and simple correlation coefficients of the
relevant economic and political variables are reported in Tables 5A and 53.
It is apparent from these tables that the political variables are not highly
correlated with most of the economic variables (including seignorage). This
may contribute to explain why the results reported below are very robust to
alternative specifications of the cross section regressions and to17
alternative measures of political instability.
However, once we control for the effect of the economic variables,
seignorage and political instability are more highly positively correlated.
Table 6 reports the Spearman Rank correlation coefficients between the
various measures of political instability and the residuals of the equations
in Table 2, Section 1. For all measures of political instability and for
all residuals, the rank correlation coefficient is positive. It is often
significant for the measure of instability estimated from the probit regres-
sions. The same is true of the Pearson simple correlation coefficients (not
reported in the table).
This is prima facie evidence that the predictions of the theory are
consistent with the data. We now turn to a more systematic investigation of
this issue.
3.3 The Cross Country Rezressions
Table 7 reports the estimates of equation (10) on the cross country
data. In the first three columns, the measure of political Instability
estimated from Table 38,F,is added to the explanatory variables in the
first three columns of Table 2. This variable is positive and highly
significant. It remains so even after including dummy variables that group
countries into continents. Compared to Table 2, the estimated coefficients
of these dummies drop significantly and the p.2's improve considerably.
The same results emerge if we replace P with the other two measures of
political instability discussed in the previous subsections, or if we
estimate the equation on developing countries only.16 These results then
provide clear support to our view that, after controlling for structural
variables, countries with a more unstable political system rely more heavily
on seignorage as a source of revenue.1718
Our model suggests that the degree to which countries rely on
seignorage not only depends on political instability but also on political.
polarization. A problem with this proposition at the empirical level is
that it is not easy to find indexes of polarization. To tackle this issue
we considered a number of proxies for polarization. We first note that the
variable P in equations (l)-(3) in Table 7 does not discriminate between
regular government changes and those originated by coups. This distinction
however may be important as an indicator of polarization: a government
change taking the form of a coup is likely to be a much more radical change
than one occurring through regular democratic procedures. Hence, according
to our theory, seignorage should be positively related to the expected fre.
quency of coups, even after controlling for other measures of instability.
This prediction is borne out by the regression analysis. In the fourth
column of Table 7, the actual frequency of coups is included among the
explanatory variables. Its estimated coefficient is positive and highly
significant. In equation (5) in Table 7 we further refine the idea that the
frequency of coups captures polarization. There we include the actual
frequency of regular government changes in 1971-82, RF, and the actual
frequency of coups as separate variables. Roth variables have a positive
and significant estimated coefficient. Rut the estimated coefficient of
coups is much larger than that of regular government changes, which is
consistent with the view that in addition to instability the frequency of
coups also proxies for polarization. This provides preliminary evidence
suggesting that both instability and polarization positively affect the
reliance on seignorage.
Highly polarized societies are also likely to have totalitarian
political systems, in which it is difficult to transfer political power.19
Democraciesare more likely to be viable in societies with a higher degree
of internal cohesiveness (Usher (1981)). Thus, democracies are likely to
have lower levels of polarization than totalitarian regimes. Hence our
theory suggests that, controlling for political instability, seignorage
should be larger in more totalitarian countries. To test this conjecture,
we replaced the coups variable in column 4 of Table 7 by a dummy taking a
value of I in democratic regimes, and 0 otherwise; its estimated coefficient
(not reported in the table) is negative and highly significant; itremains
negative (even though it becomes barely significant) if the coups variable
is also included. In addition to this dummy variable, we also used a rank.
ing of totalitarianism compiled by Freedom House (higher numbers
corresponding to more totalitarian regimes -- seethe data appendix for
detail). This index of totalitarianism is qualitative, and it does not make
much sense to include it in the regressions as an explanatory variable.18
To overcome this difficulty, we compute the Spearman rank correlation
coefficient between this index of totalitarianism and the residuals of each
of the equations in Table 7. This coefficient, denoted by p at the bottom
of Table 7, is always positive, but almost never significant.
As an alternative way to capture the role of polarization, we
incorporated in our analysis an index of income distribution as an addition-
al independent variable. To the extent that societies with more unequal
income distribution are more polarized, we would expect them to have higher
seignorage. Unfortunately data on income distribution are available for a
very limited number of countries. In spite of this, an index of income
distribution was constructed for 37 countries. The index is defined as the
proportion of total income received by the 20% richest relative to that
received by the 20% poorest fraction of the population. Thus a higher value20
of this index indicates a more unequal income distribution. As expected,
for the limited sample of 37 countries, the coefficient of income inequality
turned out to be positive although not significant at conventional levels.19
Finally, as we noted in the Introduction, the positive and significant
estimated coefficient of urbanization is also an indication that seignorage
is higher in more polarized countries. As remarked by several political
scientists, political conflicts are generally more intense and disruptive in
urban areas than in rural societies.2°
A possible objection to the results presented in Table 7 is that they
could be due to reverse causality: governments that create excessive
inflation lose popular support, and are more likely, therefore, to be thrown
out of office. Hence, inflation can lead to political instability rather
than the other way around. indeed, the probit estimates of Table 38 indi-
cate that previous inflation, although not significant, reduces the
probability of reappointment.
One way to cope with this problem would be to jointly estimate a time
series process of seignorage and government changes, along the lines of a
recent study on economic growth and coups by Londregan and Poole (1988).
However, our theoretical model has no predictions for the time series prop-
erties of seignorage. More importantly, even if we account for the effect
of past economic performance on the likelihood of reappointment, political
stability also reflects other, permanent or slowly changing, features of a
political system: political institutions, culture, tradition, underlying
conflicts, cleavage of the population in organized groups, extent of
political participation and involvement of the citizens, are all semi-
permanent features of a country that affect its political stability.21
These considerations suggest an alternative line of attack: to
estimate equation (10) by an instrumental variable method. The economic
variables are used as instruments for themselves. And as an instrument for
political instability we use the expected frequency of government change in
the previous decade, estimated by truncating the probit regressions of Table
3B in 1970 and computing the expected frequency in the decade 1960-70. This
variable is highly positively correlated with the estimated frequency for
the period 1971-82, used in Table 7, confirming that political instability
is a semi-permanent feature of a country. The Appendix discusses under what
conditions this instrument is uncorrelated with the error term of (10) ,for
the 1971-82 period. Essentially, these conditions require that the error
term of (10) not be highly correlated across different decades.
Besides correcting for a possible simultaneity bias, this instrumental
variable procedure is also likely to correct for one of the two likely
errors in measuring political instability that were mentioned in subsection
3.2. Our estimate of P incorporates more information than was available
to the governments at the time. Now, this error is corrected because the
instrument is based on probit estimates up to 1970, and thus excludes any
information incorporated in P but not available to the governments.
The results of this instrumental variable estimation are reported in
Table 8. The first three columns are the analogue of the first three
columns in Table 7. The results are very similar to those of the previous
tale. The fourth column adds the dummy variable for democracies (in place
of the coups frequency which may also be correlated with the error term)
The results confirm those of Table 7.Finally, the fifth column replaces
the estimated probability from Table 3B with that estimated on each country
separately; the same procedure is used to obtain an instrument. The results.1 )
arevery similar, even though the fit deteriorates and the estimated
coefficients on some of the economic variables become insignificant. This
occurs because the instrument has a low correlation with the variable itis
replacing. These results too are very robust to alternative specifications
of the model and to alternative measures of political instability.
Finally to evaluate the relative importance of the different
independent variables, for each regression we computed the standardized
21 estimates of each coefficient. The results suggest that, for our sample
and time period, political instability is one of the most important vari-
ables affecting seignorage. For example, in equation (I), Table 8, the
following standardized estimates were obtained: agriculture, 0.415; foreign
trade, -0.206; GD? per capita, -0.287; urbanization, 0.466; industrializa-
tion dummy,-0.571;political instability, 0.593.
Summarizing, the data are strongly consistent with the predictions of
the theory: more unstable countries collect a larger fraction of their
revenue in the form of seignorage. Moreover, the evidence is not inconsist-
ent with the view that political polarization also leads to more seignorage.
We turn now to a systematic analysis of the robustness of these
results, and to a discussion of some possible econometric problems.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Perhaps the single most important question is whether the previous
findings are robust to possible errors in measuring the explanatory
variables.22 Three :riables inparticular are likely to be measured with
error: political instability, GDP per capita and urbanization.23
To answer this question, we compute consistent bounds on the
coefficient of the variable of interest, political instability. Under the
traditional hypothesis of the errors in variables literature, the true23
coefficients that maximize the likelihood function of the measured data lie
within these bounds.24
Our procedure exploits the results of Kiepper and Learner (1984)
First, we estimate the coefficients of each of the three variables that are
measured with error by alternatively interchanging each of them with seig-
forage, thus including seignorage as a regressor. We thus obtain four sets
of estimates for each coefficient, one of which corresponds to that reported
in Table 7. The signs of the various coefficients are the same across the
four steps of estimators. As shown by Klepper and Learner (1984), we can
then conclude that the true maximum likelihood coefficients lie within the
convex hull of these four estimates.
Table 9 reports the bounds on the coefficient of political instability
for equations (1) and (4) in Table 7; political instability is measured by
the pooled probit estimate, P. In both cases, the lower bound is positive.
Equivalent results are obtained for urbanization and if we measure political
instability in the two other ways discussed in subsection 3.1. We infer
from this table that the findings of the previous subsection are robust to
the possibility of measurement error in political instability, urbanization
and per capita income.
A second important question is whether the results are robust to
alternative specifications of the model. We already commented on the fact
that alternative specifications of the probit model all yield results similar
to those reported in Tables 7 and 8. In addition, we tried several alterna-
tive specifications of the cross country regressions, again with no influence
on the result that seignorage is positively related to political instability.
Specifically, we changed the economic variables by adding other sectors
of the economy (manufacturing and mining in isolation), or dropping some of24
the variables in Table 7. None of this matters for the sign and significance
of the political variables, even though it matters for some of the economic
variables. e also tried adding other social and political variables that may
reflect political polarization. Dropping urbanization matters for some of the
economic variables, but again not for the political variables.
Je also replaced the dependent variable (change in reserve money scaled
by total government revenue) with three alternative measures of seignorage:
(a) inflation times reserve money at the beginning of the period divided by
the total revenue (including inflation times reserve money) of the central
government;(b) change in reserve money divided by GNP; (c) change in
reserve money over tax revenues inclusive of the change in reserve money.
All measures yielded the same qualitative results as those described In the
previous subsections.
The results are also robust to alternative specifications of the sample
of countries. No qualitative change occurs if the industrialized countries
are dropped from the sample (see column 6, Tables 7 and 8), or when other
countries are dropped because of missing data on some of the variables
reported in the previous paragraph. An analysis of the estimated residuals
reveals the presence of five outlier countries.25 When these countries are
dropped from the sample, the results are virtually unchanged. Finally, the
same results emerge if we reestimate the model by averaging the data over
time periods shorter than the 1971-82 interval.
The White (1980) test on the covariance matrix of the residuals rejects
the hypothesis that there is no heceroscedasticity. However, when the covari-
ance matrix of Table 7 is estimated using White (1980) consistent estimator,
the t-statistics are not substantially different from those reported in the
table and all the political variables remain significant.26 In addition, when25
the equations in Table 7 are reestimated by weighting each observation with
per capita income, the results are virtually unchanged (except for
agriculture that becomes insignificant) and the regression fit improves.
4. Conclusions
Seignorage is an optimal source of government revenue if there is
widespread tax evasion or in the presence of large tax collection costs. In
the existing literature, the nature of these costs is left unspecified, or
it is postulated to depend exclusively on exogenous features of a country,
like its stage of development or the structure of the economy. In this
paper we argue that the efficiency of the tax system also reflects deliber-
ate political decisions. In particular, the equilibrium efficiency of the
tax system, and hence seignorage, also depend on political stability and
polarization. The evidence supports this implication: more unstable
countries rely relatively more on seignorage to finance the government
budget than stable and homogeneous societies.
This empirical finding could have other explanations besides that
advanced in this paper. Political instability for instance could reflect
the fact that the collective decision process is temporarily blocked.
Seignorage would then reflect the inability to reach any policy decision,
rather than being due to costs of enforcing and administering tax collec-
tions. Alesina-Drazen (1989) have recently studied a theoretical model with
this property. But their model implies that after the identity of the
weaker party in the struggle over shares is revealed, the use of seignorage
should subside. It seems therefore that their framework is more appropriate
for explaining temporary bursts of seignorage whereas our framework is bet-
ter suited for explaining persistent cross country differences in seignorageof the type illustrated by the data in Table I.
Discriminating between these alternative political explanationsis
importaflt since they are likely to havedifferent normative implications.
According to the theory formulated in this paper,it may be ex ante effic-
ient for a politically unstable and polarized country tomaintain an
inefficient tax system: such a system reduces the variance inthe structure
of public spending or of redistributive tax policies. Putthis normative
conclusion would probably not follow from alternative political explanations
of why countries collect revenue in the form of seignorage.Further
investigation of these issues promises to be an excitingtask for future
research.27
FOOTNOTES
1See, for example, Vogel (1974). Fischer (1982) reports substantial
cross country differences in the relative amount of seignorage.
2See Edwards (1989)
3For a number of countries data on seignorage are available only for a
subinterval during 1971-82. In this case, the average is taken over the
longest time period within 1970-82 for which data are available. The
countries for which more than 3 years of data are missing are: Trinidad and
Tobago, Cameroon, Botswana, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Cote
d'Ivoire, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Zimbabwe, Ruanda, Somalia, Togo, Papua
New Guinea.
4The denominator in this ratio is total revenue inclusive of
seignorage. That is, itisdefined as the sumoftax revenue plus money
creation.
5Alternative ways of measuring seignorage basically provide us with the
same picture. In addition to the measure used in the text we have defined
seignorage as H/E, ,rH/Y, rH/E, where H is high powered money, E are
total government expenditures, is inflation, and Y is nominal income.
60n the relationship between inflation tax and structural variables
see, in particular, Hinrichs (1966), I4usgrave (1969) and Aizeniuan (1987)
Goode (1984) presents a survey of the more recent literature.
7Urbanization is the average of two years: 1965 and 1985.
8The non-developing countries have been defined as those that the IMF
classifies as industrialized, plus Greece, Portugal and Turkey.
9This same idea is at the core of some recent research that views
public debt as a strategic variable used by the current government to
influence its successors --seethe survey by Persson and Tabellini (1989,
Ch. IX). Rogers (1989) also studies tax reforms in this way.
10This specification of the economy abstracts from two possible
complications. First, it presumes that neither the government nor the
private sector have access to a capital market. Second, by not explicitly
modelling the distortionary effects of seignorage and regular taxes, it
abstracts from the time-inconsistency problems associated with both
instruments. These two complications have already been extensively
investigated in the literature, and their effects are well known -- see
Persson and Tabellini (1989). Here we neglect them in order to focus on the
novel issue of how the political system of a country governs the evolution
of its taxing institutions.
Because of the concavity of IJ(.) and the convexity of 6(•) and
-i(•), the second order conditions are always satisfied.28
12Because the Hi(.) function is linear, all the income effects of a
more inefficient tax system fall on public consumption.If H(.)was
concave, this would no longer be true, and we would needadditional
conditions COsignC'(8) and T'(9).
13We assume that the second order conditions are satisfied. As in all
optimal taxation problems, this involves some hypothesis onthe third
derivatives of U(•) and H(s).
finding is similar to those of Brennan and Buchanan (1980);
except that here the government is notmodelled as a revenue-maximizing
Leviathan, but as ideologically motivated. The source of the political
distortion is not in the nature of the government objectives,but rather in
their instability over time.
15jodice-Taylor (1983) define a regular government change as a change
in the office of national executive from one leader or ruling group to
another that is accomplished through conventional legal or customary
procedures.
16The variable P is a generated regressor. As such, our estimates of
the standard errors may be biased in general. However, this problem does
not invalidate the t-statistics for the null hypothesis thatthe estimated
coefficient of Pis zero, since under the null the standard errors are
unbiased --seePagan (1984). Since we are interested in testing precisely
this hypothesis, we do not attempt any correction. However, this may be a
problem in interpreting the t-statistics of the remainingvariables.
170f course there is a possibility of reverse causality -- from
inflation to instability. Je deal with this issue in Table 8.
18Doing so results in a positive and barely significant coefficient in
most regressions.
19The following is an example of the results obtained when income
distribution was added to the analysis:
s —0.0408+0.0010Mining & Manufacturing -0.041Foreign trade
(0.0388) (0.0012) (0.0157)
-0.l3E-4CDP Capita +0.0014Urbanization -0.0438Industrial Dummy
(0.52E-5) (0.0004) (0.0326)
+0.0723P +0.0011Income inequality N2 —
(0.0594) (0.0010) a— 0.557
point of view is stressed for instance in Berg-Sachs (1988) and
Huntington (1968).
standardized coefficient is the estimated coefficient divided by
the size of its standard error.29
22The dependent variable, seignorage as defined in Table 1, is also
most certainly measured with error. However, this fact merely increases the
standard error of the regression, without introducing any bias in the
estimates.
noted above, the instrumental variable estimation can remove a
component of the error in measuring political instability. But a large
margin of error is likely to remain unaccounted for, since we have little
confidence about the correct specification of the probit regressions.
24The hypothesis is that the measurement errors are orthogonal to each
other and to the unobserved correctly measured regressors.
25The outliers are: Portugal, Bolivia, Mexico, Ghana and Uganda.
26W'hite (1980) estimator does not rely on a formal model of the
structure of heteroscedasticity.30
APPENDIX
This section outlines the identifying assumptions implicit in the
instrumental variables procedure of Section 3.4. According to the
theoretical model, seignorage in country i at timet should be: —
S(S
wherethe function S(9) has been discussed in the text.
Presumably, the observed data on seignorage also reflect other country and
time specific shocks due to policy mistakes or exogenous events. Thus,
s
+v (Al)
where is observed seignorage and is a shock. For any variable
let x —1/12E971 Thus, x is the average of x. during
the 1971-82 period. We assume that the function S(9) can be approximated
as follows:
— + + 'i'r + e (A.2)
where x is a vector of observed economic variables that measure the
structure of the economy (the variables in Table 2), .isthe indicator
of political instability, and e. is an unobserved error term, Combining
(Al) and (A.2), we have:
—+ $xi ÷ +(v+e1)
(A.3)
The null hypothesis is: H0: -y —0.
The problem is that is unobserved. Our two stage procedure can be
described as follows. In the first stage, we assume that can be
estimated using a probit procedure from annual data. Thus, we postulate:
—prob(0 (A.4)
where and are coefficients to be estimated, z. is a vector of31
observed variables, and u is an error term. Besides observing
z.t.
we
also observe whether or not the inequality in (A.4) holds. The interpreta-
tion is that a government change is triggered by specific realizations of
the explanatory variables in (A.4) or of the error termu.. By (Al) the
shocks vt-l canbe interpreted as competence shocks, along the lines of
Rogoff-Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990): an incompetent government one with
ahigh v. t-1'is punished by the voters through a higher probability of
losingoffice. This is the first important identifying assumption. It is
not seignorage oer se that causes a government change. It is a higher
seignorage than warranted by the efficiency of the inherited tax system. In
the empirical implementation of (A.4), we proxyv by the observed
inflation rate in previous years, in deviation from the country specific
mean. The remaining variables corresponding to the vector are listed
in Table 3. They, as well as the error term are assumed to be
uncorrelated with the error term of (A.3), (v.+e.).
By estimating the coefficients and p in (A.4) with a probit
model, we obtain an estimate of jt' The average of is thus a
complicated nonlinear function of past values of z and u:
—F(vji.zi,uj;
t—1948-82). (AS)
In the second stage, we estimate (A.3) by replacing
ir.with.
The
OLS procedure of Table 7 is consistent under the additional identifying
assumption that p —0in (A.4). That is, the competence shocks do not
effect the probability of government change. Incidentally, this assumption
is consistent with the findings of Table 3.
If however p0, then OLSestimationof (A.3) gives inconsistent
estimators, since by (A.5) and v are correlated with each other. To32
dealwith this problem. we estimate (A.3) by means ofthefollowing
instrumental variables procedure. First, we truncate the probitestimation
of (A.4) in 1970 Then, we take the average of the estimated over the
period 1960-70Let us denote this average " iS' where the s reminds
us of the different subperiod. Wehave
— t— 1948-70) (A 6)
.isour instrument for i..Clearly,it is correlated with ..By
1_s
I_ 1.
(A.6)it is not correlated with the error term of (A.3) ,(v+e.)if v.
is a statistically independent process or, more weakly,if the realizations
of the competence shocks V.,duringthe 1970s are statistically independ-
ent from their realizations during the 1948-70 period.This is our second
identifying assumption. Obviously this identifyingrestriction remains the
same if we interpret the vs more broadly as anydeviation between s.
and rather than just as competence shocks. This assumption is
consistent with a lot of serial correlation in inflation. By (A.1),this
serial correlation is due to inertia in the tax system, and hence tothe
variable .,butnot to the "competence shocks" of the government.33
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15Congo, Peoples Republic 9.759 4.6259
16Cote d'Ivoire 11.552 1.1941
17Denmark 10.043 0.7939
18Dominican Republic 10.015 6.7991
19Ecuador 13.271 14.4242


































53Papua New Guinea 8.614 0.4102
54Paraguay 12.888 15.4742




59 South Africa 11.3408 2.8834
60Sierra Leone 13.7550 9.5254
61Singapore 6.6017 8.8053
62Somalia 18.8608 15.4258
63 Spain 14.9967 9.1178










74United Kingdom 13.2083 1.7822





Source: Computed from raw data obtained from International Financial
Statistics.TA.LE 2
Seiznoraze and Structural Variables
Dependent variable: Seignorage
Developing
All Countries Countries Only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ExplanatoryVariables
**
Intercept 0.0558 01185 0.0343 0.0156 -0.0167
(0.0404) (0.0194) (0.0312) (0.0316) (00696)
* ** ** * Agriculture 0.0014 - 0.0017 0.0020 0.0024
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011)
Mining and - -0.50E-4 - - 0.0007
Manufacturing (0.68 E-3) (0,0013)
** ** * * *
ForeignTrade -0.0514 -0.0626 -0.0418 -0.0546 -0.0512
(0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0203)
* *. *
GDPPer Capita -0.58 E-5 -0.72 E-5 -0.57 E-5 -0.40 E-5 -0.55 E-5
(0.25 E-5) (0.30 E-5) (0.25 E-5) (0.25 E-5) (0.39 E-3)
** ** * ** ** Urbanization 0.0014 0.0010 0.0011 0.0022 0.0023
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
* * Industrialized -0.0467 -0.0511 - - -
(0.0190) (0.0203)
Asia - - 0.0293 - -
(0.0183)
* LatinAmer.ca - - 0.0430 - -
(0.0210)
0.333 0.281 0.357 0.369 0.360
SE. 0.054 0.056 0.053 0.052 0.052
notes:Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Method of estimation: OLS
Number of countries: columns (1)-(3): 79
columns(4),(5): 58
Anasterisk denotes significance at the 5% confidence level. Two asterisks
at the 1% level.TABLE 3A
Variable Definitions
1..Government Chanze
Government change —Dummyvariable taking a value of 1 for the years in
which there is either a coup or a regular government transfer, and a
value of 0 otherwise.[Source: Taylor-Jodice (1983)1.
2. Economic Performance
Inflation —Annualrate of growth of CD? deflator.[Source: Constructed
from Swiuners-Heston (1988)1
Economic Growth —Cumulativerate of growth of private consumption in the
current and previous two years.[Source: Summers-Heston (1988)1
3.political Events
Riots —Violentriots.[Source: Taylor-Jodice (1983)1
Repressions —Politicalexecutions and government imposed sanctions.
[Source: Taylor-Jodice (1983)1
Executive Adjustments —Changesin the composition of the executive not
resulting in government transfers. [Source: Taylor-Jodice (1983))
Attempts —Unsuccessfulattempts to change the government, taking the form
of unsuccessful coups and unsuccessful government transfers.[Source:
Taylor-Jodice (1983))
YearsYears from previous government change.
4. Structural Variables
GD? Per Capita in constant U.S. $of1975 —[Source:Sunimers-Heston (1988)]
Democracya dummy variable taking a value of I for democracies and 0
otherwise.[Source: Banks, various volumes)
Elections —adummy variable taking a value of I if the election date is
determined by the constitution and 0 otherwise.[Source: Banks,
various volumes]
Majority —adummy variable taking a value of I for presidential systems or
for parliamentary governments supported by a single majority party, and
O otherwise.[Source: Banks, various volumes]
The variables inflation, consumption growth, protests, riots, and
repressions are all in deviation from their country-specific means.TABLE 3B
Probit Estimates
Dependent Variable: Government change
Explanatory Variables: Current Lazed Once Lazed Twice
Government Change - - .0793 -.0315
(.0822) (.0774)
Inflation - .0020 .0030
(.0012) (.0023)
Consumption Growth -.3894 - -
(.2652)
Riots .0052 .0016 .0060
(.0040) (.0040) (.0037)
**
Repressions .0047 -.0013 .0019
(.0018) (.0009) (.0013)
** * ExecutiveAdjustment .0828 .0493 -.0182
(.0242) (.0234) (.0226)
**
Attempts .3995 -.0138 -.0232
(.0670) (.0358) (.0357)
Years -.0004 - -
(.0113)











*** Note:Standard errors are in parenthesis. A () denotes stgnLflcance at
the 5 (1%) confidence interval.





Time period: 1948.82. If a country became independent after 1948, only the
years since independence have been included.TABLE 4
SpearmanRank Correlation Coefficients






F —Actualaverage frequency of government change.
P —Estimatedaverage frequency obtained from the probit regressions of
Table 3.
PS —Estimatedaverage frequency obtained by running the probit model
separately on each country.
The numbers in parentheses are the significance probability of the estimated






























0.268 0.189Note: The variables, F, P and PS have been defined in Table 4.
The numbers in parentheses are the significance probability of the estimated










































































- .pearmpnRank Correlations Between Political
Instability and Seignoraze Residuals
Sejnorae Res. 1 Res. 2 Res. 3 Res. 4 Res 5
F -0.0248 0.182 0.187 0.116 0.096 0.076
(0.834) (0.108) (0.099) (0.310) (0.472) (0.569)
** * * * P 0.084 0.322 0.313 0.247 0.266 0.218
(0.460) (0.004) (0.005) (0.029) (0.043) (0.100)
PS -0.025 0.194 0.189 0.115 0.092 0.068
(0.827) (0.087) (0.960) (0.311) (0.493) (0.614)
Notes: Res. i is the estimated residual of eq. (i) in Table 2.
The numbers in parentheses indicate the significance of the estimated
coefficient under the null that the true coefficient is zero.
An asterisk denotes significance at the 5% confidence level. Two asterists
at the 1% level.TABLE 7




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) ___________
ExplanatorYVariables
Intercept 00071 0.0898**.00015 0.0158 0.0340 -00201.
(00294) (0.0189) (0.0301) (0.0290) (0.0281) (00319)
** ** * * **
Agriculture 0.0016 - 0.0018 0.0013 0.0012 0.0021.
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005\
tining and
- -0.0007 - - - -
1anufacturing (0.0168)
* * * ** *
ForeignTrade -0.0430 -0.0511 -0.0350 .0.0415 -0.0474 -0.0431
(0.0166) (0.0169) (0.0177) (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0182)
* * * * *
CD?Per Capita -0.52 E-5 .0.53 E-5 .0.46 E-5 -0.52 E-5 -0.51 E-S -0.44 E-5
(0.22 E-5) (0.27 E-5) (0.23 E-5) (0.22 E-5) (0.22 E-5) (0.24 E-5)
** * * ** ** **
UranizatLon 0.0013 0.0008 0.0011 0.0013 0.0015 0.0019
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0,0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
** ** ** **
IndustrLalLzed.0.0746 -0.0844 - -0.0694 -0.0767 -
(0.0182) (0.0218) (0.0180) (0.0201)
Asia - - 0.0036 - - -
(0.0180)
Latin America - - 0.0268 - - -
(0.0196)
** ** ** ** **
P 0.1840 0.1849 0.1759 0.1468
- 0.1583
(0.0421) (0.0456) (0.0458) (0.0449) (0,0539)




- - . 0.1326 0.1865 -
(0.0623) (0.0593)
0.461 0.407 0.461 0.486 0.464 0.448
SE. 0.048 0.051 0.048 0.047 0.048 0.049
* * * *
p 0.1923 0.2460 0.2192 0.1632 0.1216 0.2704
(0.0895) (0.0289) (0.0523) (0.1508) (0.2857) (0.0401)Table 7(cont,)
otes: umber of observations: 79. All observations are yearlyaverages,
over the period 1971-82.
p is the estimated frequency of government change obtained from
Table 3forthe 1971-82 period.
RF is the actual frequency of regular government transfers in
1971-82.
Coups is the average actual frequency of coups (over 1971-82)
p is the Spearrnan rank correlation coefficient between the estimated
residuals and the index of Totalitarianism (averaged over 1971-82).
Standard errors are in parentheses. The numbers inside the
parentheses below the p estimate give the significance probabiLity
of the estimate under the null: p —0.
An asterisk denotes significance at the 5% confidence level: two
asterisks at the 1% level.TABLE 8
Instrumental Variable Estimation
Dependent VariableSeignorage
A 1 1C o Ufl t ri e $ Develop.
Countries
(1.) (2) (3) (4) (5) __________
Ext'anatOrVVariabi
**
Intercept -0.0084 0.0857 0.0183 0,0070 -0.0160 -0.0541.
(0.0339) (0.0219) (0.0340) (0.0335) (0.0505) (0.0395)
** ** ** * **
Agriculture 0.0017
- 0.0019 0.0015 0.0015 0.0021
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Mining and
- -0.0009 - - - -
Manufacturing (0.0007)
* ** *
ForeignTrade -0.0370 -0.0501 -0.0287 -0.0359 -0.0272 -0.0278
(0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0167) (0.0246) (0.0209)
* * *
GD?Per Capita -0,48 E-5-0.45 E-5 -0.41 E-5 -0.55 E-5 -0.59 E-5-0.46 E-
(0.22 E-5) (0.28 E-5) (0.26 E-5) (0.22 E-5) (0.29 E-5) (0.26 £-5)
** * * ** **
Urbanization 0.0012 0.0007 0.0010 0.0013 0.0009 0.0016
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
** ** * ** **
IndustriaLized-0.0836 -0.0922 -0.0707 -0.0724 -0.1228
(0.0206) (0.0239) (0.0323) (0.0206) (0.0431)
Asia
- - -0.0011 - - -
(0.0220)
Latin America - - 0.0232 - - -
(0.0217)
** ** ** ** **
P 0,2508 0.2327 0.2562 0.2430
- 0.3220
(0.0759) (0.0857) (0.0887) (0.0737) (0.1052)
PS - - - - 0.3881*
(0.1840)
Democracy
- - -0.0307* - -
(0.0148)
0.425 0.361 0.437 0.448 0.264 0.409
S.E. 0.048 0.0504 0.048 0.0472 0.0646 0.0523
* * * *
p 0.1783 0.2289 0.2072 0.0567 0.1648 0.3279
(0.1158) (0.0424) (0.0669) (0.0698) (0.1467) (0.0120)Table 8 (cpnt.)
Notes: Number of observations: 78 (Papua New Guinea became independent
after 1970 and hence is omitted from this sample)
Method of estimation: instrumental variables.
The instrument for F is the estimated frequency of government
change for the period 1960-70, estimated by truncating the probit
model in 1970.
The instrument for F is the actual frequency of government change
during the period 1960-70.
P and F are as defined in Table 6. Democracy is defined as in
Table 3.
pisthe Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the
estimated residuals and the index of Totalitarianism (averaged over
1971-82).TABLE 9
Bounds on the Coefficient of P
Equation (1) (4) (6)
Lower Bound 0.1068 0.0791 0.0466
Upper Bound 0.8878 1.1233 1.1130
Column numbers refer to the equations in Table 7.Data Source and Definitions
Inaddt:ionto the variables defined in Table 3A, we used the following
variables
Seignorage —changein reserve money divided by total revenue of central
government including seignorage. Source: IFS and GFS, LMF.
Agricultural Product —shareof GD? produced in the agricultural sector.
Source: World Tables, World Bank.
Mining and Manufacturing Product —shareof GD? produced in the mining and
manufacturing sectors. Source: World Tables, World Bank.
Foreign Trade —importsplus exports as fraction of GD?. Source:IFS, IMF.
Urbanization —urbanpopulation as a percent of total population (average of
data for 1965 and 1985).Soi.irce; World Development Report (1988).
Inflation —Table1:rate of change of CPI. Source: IFS, IMF.
Table 3B:rate of change of GD? deflator. Source:
Reconstructed form Summers-Heston (1987).
Index of Totalitarianism: Source: Freedom of Issue, various issues.'J- 1
Worki.ns
Proof of Prorosition1:Inserting the budget constraints (1) and (2) in (4)





Let Fand Hbe thepartialderivative of F(.) and H(.) with
x X














H —-'u'+ (l+-i')2u' < 0
H9 —0
Combining (A.2) and (A.3) we obtain
S'(9) — (l+-y')2(l+6')u" > 0
(A.4)
T'(9) —(1+1')(-"u'+(l+')2u) < 0
Next, differentiate the government budget constraint, equation (1), withW-2
respect to 9,recalling that +g
—X(8).We have:
—-r + S'(9)+(l-9)T'(O) (A.5)
Inserting A4)and(A.l) in (AS), it can be shown that X(9) <0.
Similarly, differentiating the private budget constraint, equation (1),
with respect to 9, we obtain
C'(8) —-(l+8')T'(9) (l+7')S'(G) (A6)
Inserting (A.4) and (Al) in (A.6) and simplifying we obtain that
C'(9)>0.